Proof of Concept — File Hashing and Draw Integrity
Every OCSA certified draw includes a SHA-256 hash of the operator's entry list, recorded permanently on the blockchain at the moment the draw runs. This page lets you see exactly how that works — and why it matters.
How it works
When an operator runs a certified draw, their entry list is fingerprinted using a cryptographic process called SHA-256 hashing. The fingerprint is unique to that exact file. Change a single character — a name, a ticket number, a space — and the fingerprint changes completely.
The hash is embedded in the draw certificate and written to the Polygon blockchain before the result is announced. If an operator were to alter their entry list after the draw — to swap winners, remove entrants, or adjust ticket numbers — the hash on the certificate would no longer match the file. The discrepancy would be permanent and publicly visible.
There is no way to alter a file and preserve its hash.
OCSA does not receive, store or process any entrant personal data. The entry list never leaves the operator's systems — hashing takes place entirely within the operator's browser. OCSA sees only the hash.
Try it yourself
We ran a certified demonstration draw for a 1965 Morris Minor Pickup using the example entry list below. 500 tickets were sold, numbered 1 to 500. The winning ticket was number 23, drawn by the OCSA certified RNG and recorded permanently on the Polygon blockchain.
The certificate records the winning ticket number - not the winner's name. The operator cross-references ticket 23 against their entry list to identify and contact the winner. This is by design: OCSA certifies the draw, not the personal data. The operator publishes the entry list BEFORE the draw on their website and this is the list captured by the hashing procedure and added to our certificate. If this published list ever changes you can be confident that the hash will no longer match and it is immediately evident that the list published by the operator is not the same list used for the draw.
The entry list hash on certificate OCSA-2026-05-07-3164 matches the file exactly. Download the example file (we haven’t changed it since the certification), drag it into the hashing tool, and compare the result to the Entry List Hash on the certificate.
🔽 [Download the test entry list]
📄 [View draw certificate — OCSA-2026-05-07-3164]
🔗 [Open SHA-256 hashing tool]
The hashing tool is a free third-party tool. Your file is never uploaded — the calculation happens entirely within your browser. Feel free to download the test file onto your pc and test the hash matches on any hashing tool of your choice.
Now try the altered version
At first glance the altered file is identical in every respect - same entrants, same ticket numbers, same email addresses. Only one change has been made: the ticket numbers held by Noah Diaz and Michael Morgan have been swapped. Noah Diaz was the legitimate winner on ticket 23. In this version, Michael Morgan holds ticket 23 instead.
Find rows 23 and 47 in each file and you will see the difference. Now hash the altered file and compare the result to the certificate. The hash will not match - because the file has been tampered with. Even the smallest change ( a single letter or punctuation mark) will completely alter the hash code
🔽 [Download altered entry list]
This is what fraud looks like from the outside. One swap. Invisible to anyone reading the file casually. Permanently detectable by the hash.
Why this matters
In a traditional prize draw, an unscrupulous operator could alter their entry list after the draw without anyone really knowing. The OCSA certified draw system makes that impossible to do silently. The hash is on the blockchain before the result is announced. The entry list is in the operator's hands. If they ever disagree, the blockchain wins.
No trust required. No reliance on OCSA. No reliance on the operator. The proof is public, permanent and verifiable by anyone with a browser.
OCSA certified draws record the entry list hash on the Polygon blockchain before the result is announced. Verification is permanent, public, and requires no trust in OCSA, the operator, or any third party.